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A Survey and Commentary on the
Good Faith Meeting of Competition
Defense in the Robinson-Patman Act
Jason C. Blackford
The good faith meeting of competition defense contained in the Rob-
inson-Patman Act can, in Mr. Blackford's opinion, be the means of
bringing economic rationality to the act. However, to do so the courts
and the Federal Trade Commission must be cognizant of the economic
realities of the market place. After placing the defense in historical per-
spective, the author discusses the different facets of the defense and the
often varying interpretations given them by the courts and the Commis-
sion. Mr. Blackford concludes by critically evaluating the whole of the
Robinson-Patman Act and suggesting guidelines for the application ot
the defense until remedial legislation can be enacted.
C1rHE PRIMARY motivating force behind the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman Act was a desire to prevent the large retail
chain stores from using their great purchasing power to obtain
commodities at a lower cost than could their smaller competitors.
Instead of directly attacking
the economic power of these
THE AUTHOR (B.A., Denison Univer- chains, the act's draftsmen
sity, LL.B., Yale University) is a prac- and
ticing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio, and sought to prohibit abusive
a member of the Ohio Bar. discriminatory pricing practices
by prohibiting a seller from
marketing his product at more
than one price. The belief was that by placing the prohibition on
the seller, he would be able to resist the coercive pressure of a
large buyer.
One of the defenses available to a party charged with a violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act is found in section 2(b)2 of that
statute, which, in its entirety, states:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this
section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or
facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person
149 Star. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). For the purposes of this discus-
sion, "Robinson-Patman Act" -will be used to designate those amendments to the Clay-
ton Act, 38 Star. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964) which -were
enacted in 1936.
249 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
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charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification
shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue
an order terminating the discrimination: (Provided, however, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-
facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the fur-
nishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was
made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor,
or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.)
The first portion of section 2 (b) is strictly procedural, as it shifts
to the seller the burden of rebutting a prima fade case of discrimi-
nation in prices, services, or facilities. The subsequent proviso is
known as the "good faith meeting of competition" defense. This
defense is one of the more controversial and least settled provisions
of the Robinson-Patman Act.
An analysis will be made here of the key concepts underlying
this vital defense, emphasis being placed upon the position of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the divergent opinions of
reviewing courts. At the conclusion of this analysis, it will be
shown that the application and construction of the good faith meet-
ing of competition defense can be the key to the coalescence of the
Robinson-Patman Act with the other federal antitrust statutes and
that this proviso can also bring economic rationality to the Rob-
inson-Patman Act. In order to create a proper perspective for this
survey, a brief recounting of the legislative history of this defense
will be undertaken.
I. LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The prohibition against price discrimination contained in sec-
tion 2 of the original Clayton Act asserted, in part, that "[NIothing
herein contained shall prevent . . . discrimination in price in the
same or different communities made in good faith to meet compe-
tition."'  This provision was included by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee to allay fears of a complete legal ban on price discrimination.4
The congressional debates indicate that the meeting of competition
proviso was not meant to be an exculpatory concept but rather a
refutation of possible anti-competitive implications which might be
attributed to discriminations in price.'
Proponents of amendments to the original Clayton Act asserted
338 Stat. 730 (1914).
4S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1914).
5 RowE, PRIcE DIscRlwNATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 208-10
(1962).
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that the good faith proviso made the section almost unenforceable
as a means of combating price discriminations where two or more
sellers were willing to grant a price reduction to a large buyer' or
where predatory price cutting was designed to eliminate smaller
rivals.7 The report of the House Judiciary Committee on the
clause8 that was finally enacted in the Robinson-Patman Act stated,
"This proviso represents a contraction of an exemption now con-
tained in section 2 of the Clayton Act which permits discriminations
without limit where made in good faith to meet competition."'
The legislative debates and the Conference Committee Report
indicate that Congress was discarding the good faith meeting of
competition proviso of the original Clayton Act in an attempt to
strengthen the act. The 1936 provision was intended to operate
only as a rule of evidence permitting a seller to rebut a prima fade
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act."0 The congressional assump-
tion underlying this rebuttal was that a price quotation which was
made in good faith to meet a competitor's equally low price could
not logically damage competition. In spite of its dear legislative
history, there has been a dichotomy between the original intent of
the good faith meeting of competition proviso and the pricing sys-
tems permitted by the courts under that defense. The strongest
advocate of the meeting of competition defense as originally inter-
preted has been the FTC, but its rulings have been reversed many
times by the appellate courts.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Application
The initial problem area of the good faith meeting of compe-
8 H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936). It is of interest to note
that in the interim between 1914-1936 there was not one reported case where the good
faith meeting of competition defense was accepted.
7 FrC, Final Report on Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc(. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 90 (1935).
sThe Senate version retained the defense as worded in the original Clayton Act.
The Senate-House Conference adopted the House proviso under pressure of the propon-
ents of a strict prohibition against price discrimination.
9 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936).
10 H. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936). Representative Utterback
stated on the floor of the House:
It is to be noted, however, that this does not set up the meeting of compe-
tition as an absolute bar to a charge of discrimination under the bill. It merely
permits it to be shown in evidence. This provision is entirely procedural.
It does not determine substantive rights, liabilities, and duties. 80 CoNG. REc.
9418 (1936).
Senator Van Nuys also indicated such an understanding, id. at 9903.
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tition defense is determining its scope. The legislative history and
the wording of the good faith proviso dearly indicate that section
2(a)1 and 2(e) 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act are within the ambit
of the 2(b) defense. The specific reference of section 2(b), "lower
price or the furnishing of services or facilities," indicates the clear
intent of Congress to permit good faith justification of discrimina-
tions in price, services, and facilities. A failure to permit such a
defense in these areas would in economic terms seriously hinder
competition.' 3 Litigation concerning the applicability of the 2(b)
defense has primarily centered around its use in cases involving sec-
tions 2(d)' 4 and 2(c). 5
The FTC in a series of decisions in the mid-1950's took the
position that the section 2(b) defense could not be utilized to protect
a supplier's disproportionate payments for a customer's promotional
services or facilities as prohibited by section 2(d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.'" This view was incorporated into the FTC Guides
for Advertising Allowances and other Merchandising Payments and
Services.' The courts have rejected this interpretation. In Exqui-
site Form Brassiere, Inc. v, FTC," the foundation was laid for a
challenged system of promotional allowances to be validated under
the good faith meeting of competition proviso. The appellate court
found the legislative history was not dispositive and sought other
factors on which to base its decision.'" Section 2(d) was analogized
to section 2(a):
The economic evil sought to be outlawed by it [The Robinson-Pat-
man Act] is the same whether the services and facilities are fur-
nished to the customer or by the customers with reimbursement,
so long as discrimination is practiced. Congress was here dealing
with a fundamental economic concept .... It is impossible to be-
lieve that it meant to treat one process of discrimination one way
and to treat in another way another process equally effective as
discrimination.2"
1149 Star. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
1249 Star. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964).
-1 See text accompanying notes 59-75 infra.
14Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (d), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 13 (d) (1964).
15 Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (c), 49 Star. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 5 13 (c) (1964).
16 Admiral Corp., 55 F.T.C. 2078 (1959); J. H. Filbert, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 359 (1957);
Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535 (1956).
171 TRADB REG. REP. 5 3980, at 6078 (1965).
18301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
19 Id. at 506. The case of Delmar Constr. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1961
Trade Cas. 77769 (S.D. Fla. 1961) was relied upon by the court as judicial precedent
for applying the § 2(b) proviso to § 2(d). 301 F.2d at 506 n.10.
20 Id. at 502.
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The reasoning of Exquisite Form was reaffirmed in Shulton, Inc.
v. FTC.21 There the appellate court reversed a Commission attempt
to hold as a matter of law that a defendant charged with a viola-
tion of section 2(d) could not be permitted to introduce evidence
that the payments to the customer as advertising allowances were
made individually and in good faith.
Although the courts have extended the good faith defense to
section 2(d), there has been a consistent refusal to extend section
2(b) to apply to section 2(c). Several early decisions held that the
brokerage provisions of section 2(c) must be read independently of
section 2(b).' The reason for this interpretation is that in a vio-
lation of section 2(c) there has not been discrimination in prices,
services, or facilities, but the parties have engaged in a brokerage
practice designed to deceive others as to the actual price paid,
whether or not that price is discriminatory.23 Therefore, neither
the legislative history nor economic logic dictates extension of the
meeting of competition proviso to section 2 (c) violations.
Although the proviso specifies that a "seller" may use the good
faith meeting of competition defense, it has implications for section
2(f)' which imposes liability upon a buyer for inducing price dis-
crimination In at least one case, Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC,2
the court held that the section 2(b) defense was relevant to the
determination of knowledge of the buyer:
As to these [the defenses of sections 2(a) and 2(b)], in a section
2(f) proceeding it is part of the Commission's burden of going
forward with the evidence to show that the buyer knew that the
seller could not justify the prior differential under one or both.
Even though judicial decisions have placed upon the FTC the bur-
21305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962).
22 Modern Marketing Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cit. 1945); Quality
Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cit. 1940).
23 An excellent opinion on this distinction is found in FTC v. Washington Fish &
Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th Cit. 1959). Bat see FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363
U.S. 166 (1960).
2 4 Robinson-Patnan Act § 2(f), 49 Star. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964).
25 The Supreme Court laid the basis for this application in Automatic Canteen Co.
of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), wherein the Court held that the evidentiary
shift of the burden of proof contained in § 2 (b) requires the Commission to demon-
strate that the buyer knew the seller was selling at discriminatory prices. The implica-
tion is clear that to establish a § 2 (f) violation, proof must be introduced that the buyer
knew the defenses of §§ 2(a) and 2(b) were unavailable.
26287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cart. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961).
27Id. at 517. See also American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
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den of going forward with evidence pertaining to the meeting of
competition, the Commission has refused to compile evidence of a
lack of justification and has relied upon the nature of the price
discrimination to show that the differentials were unjustified 28 As
a practical matter the issue has become what type of evidence and
how much proof is necessary to demonstrate the buyer's knowledge
of unjustifiable price differentials.
In summary, the good faith defense of section 2(b) may be
asserted to justify acts that would otherwise be in violation of sections
2 (a), 2 (d), and 2 (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2 (b)
is applicable in a section 2 (f) proceeding to show knowledge of the
buyer that the seller's prices were not justifiable. Only the broker-
age provision of section 2(c) is outside the scope of the meeting
of competition defense because the gravamen of that offense is the
intent to deceive rather than to discriminate.
B. The Good Faith Meeting of Competition Proviso
as an Absolute Defense
The good faith meeting of competition proviso of section 2 (b)
has been construed as providing a complete legal justification for
illegal discriminatory practices. In dicta, the Supreme Court in
Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC noted that section 2(b) was a com-
plete defense to a discriminatory pricing system.8" On the same
day, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in FTC v. A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co.81 which analyzed a section 2(b) rebuttal of an
industry-wide illegal pricing system. Although the Court held that
the defendant corporation had not sustained its factual burden of
establishing a good faith defense, Mr. Chief Justice Stone stated:
"The change in language [from the original good faith provisol
of this exception was for the purpose of making the defense a
matter of evidence in each case, raising a question of fact as to
whether the competition justified the discrimination."82
In Standard Oil Co.,8" the FTC interpreted this approach of
the Supreme Court as meaning that the legal force of the rebuttal
2 8 D & N Auto Parts Co., 55 F.T.C. 1279, 1302 (1959).
29324 U.S. 726 (1945).
80 Id. at 735.
81324 U.S. 746 (1945).
32 1d. at 752-53.
3341 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), arevd, 340 U.S.
231 (1951).
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would be nullified if the evidence indicated that a competitive in-
jury was present. 4 The full Commission rejected the hearing
examiner's finding that Standard Oil had established a section 2(b)
defense. The FTC held illegal Standard's practice of selling to
four large "jobbers" in the Detroit area at prices which were one
and one-half cents per gallon less than those charged to retail ser-
vice stations.35 Each of these "jobbers" had at one time or another
sold on the retail level. A dear prima fade case of price dis-
crimination was presented.
The Supreme Court, when it finally accepted the case, chose
to rule on two issues: (1) whether the sales involved were in inter-
state commerce, and (2) whether Standard's lower price to the
"jobbers" was justified because made to retain them as customers
and in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."6
On the latter point, Standard's contention was that in the highly
competitive oil industry other refiners offered lower prices to large
customers in order to obtain their business.37 The majority opinion,
relying upon the Court's opinions in Corn Prods.,.8 and A. E.
Staley9 and upon its interpretation of the congressional intent of
section 2(b), 0 said:
The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in
the value of competition.... We need not now reconcile, in its
entirety, the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Pat-
man Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. It is enough
to say that Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act
either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that a
seller would have no substantial rights of self-defense against a
price raid by a competitor. For example, if a large customer re-
quests his seller to meet a temptingly lower price offered to him
by one of his seller's competitors, the seller may well find it essen-
tial, as a matter of business survival, to meet that price rather than
to lose the customer ... There is ... plain language and estab-
lished practice which permits a seller, through section 2 (b), to re-
tain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price of-
341d. at 281-82.
35 Id. at 281-84.
36 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 234 (1951).
371d. at 238.
3 8 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
39 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
40 In a footnote in the opinion, the Court stated: "We find that the legislative his-
tory, at best, is inconclusive." Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 247-48 n.14
(1951). The dissent written by Mr. Justice Reed presents a more accurate attempt to
decipher the intent of Congress. The minority interpretation contended that the Rob-
inson-Patman Act was intended to restrict the use of this defense. Id. at 256-61.
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feted to that customer, without necessarily changing the seller's
price to its other customers.4 '
The majority recognized the economic fact that a seller's good
faith meeting of a competitor's equally low price does not affect
the competitive situation on the buyer level.4" Defensive pricing
by a reacting seller was determined not to cause any competitive
injury on the customer level, as the purchaser could have accepted
the price of the seller's competition.48 In holding that Standard
Oil could justify its practices by a section 2(b) defense, the good
faith meeting of competition proviso became an absolute and com-
plete defense to a discriminating practice charge. Although this
decision established the 2(b) defense as an absolute defense, sub-
sequent cases were necessary to determine the facts necessary to
prove that there was a good faith meeting of a competitors' equally
low price. It was not until December 31, 1963, that the FTC
filed its first reported44 opinion 8 wherein the Commission found
facts which sustained a discrimination defense based on section 2(b).
The foregoing typifies a condition which has occurred in many
areas of trade regulation - the views of the FTC were not ac-
cepted by reviewing judicial bodies. The result is the partial devel-
opment of two standards by which the facts of a case are analyzed
- the Commission's and the courts'.
C. Meeting a Competitor's eLawful" Lower Price
In Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,4 both the majority and the dis-
senting Supreme Court opinions characterized the competitor's price
which a seller may meet in good faith as a "lawful lower price."47
The FTC has interpreted the phrase to prevent the assertion of the
meeting of competition defense in those situations where a reasonably
41 Id. at 248-50. (Footnotes omitted.)
421d. at 250.
43 Ibid.
44 In 1938, the FTC supplied Representative Wright Patman (D-Tex.), one of the
statute's authors, with "informal opinions" explaining the Commission's reasons for
dosing sixty-four price discrimination cases without filing formal complaints. Among
these cases were several opinions which accepted the good faith meeting of competition
as a complete defense. It should also be noted that the Commission's early cease and
desist orders under § 2 (a) expressly recognized the party's right to meet in good faith
a competitor's equally low prices. ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION TODAY 176
(2d ed. 1966).
45 Continental Baking Co., No. 7630, FTC, Dec. 31, 1963.
46 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
47 Id. at 238, 242, 252. See also Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 397, 408, 410
(1958).
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prudent seller knew or should have known that his competitor's
lower price violated the Robinson-Patman Act. For example, in
B. Bdelmann & Co.4 the hearing examiner permitted the introduc-
tion of evidence on the quesion of whether the seller knew or
should have known about the illegality of his competitor's prices.4
The difficulty with the Commission's position is that it forces the
businessman to speculate as to the legality of the prices quoted by
his competitors. This is illustrated by the Commissioner's and
hearing examiner's rulings in Standard Motors Prods., Inc."0 The ex-
aminer had held that the section 2(b) defense failed in part because
the seller should have known that the prices which were alleged
to have been met were illegal as they were volume discounts which
could not be cost justified. 1 The Commission upheld the examiner
on this point by showing that the competitive prices had in the
interim been declared illegal in another case." The position *of
the Commission has remained the same in recent decisions.
The courts have taken a slightly different approach on this
issue. They have distinguished between industry-wide collusive
prices and individual competitive prices. Where a seller adopts an
illegal reciprocal industry-wide pricing system, the good faith meet-
ing of competition is not available as a means of justification. The
Supreme Court's decisions in Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC and
FTC v. A. B. Staley Mfg. Co.' regarded the section 2 (b) defense
as inapplicable to industry-wide basing point systems. The courts
and the Commission are in agreement that the meeting of compe-
tition defense will not justify a series of reciprocal illegal price
discriminations, each validating the other in the guise of meeting
a competitor's lower price. While disapproving participation in an
illegal reciprocal pricing system, the courts may permit an individual
seller in a competitive situation to meet a competitor's illegal price."
This right of self-defense is not only economically sound but also
4851 F.T.C. 978 (1955), affd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 941 (1958).
491d. at 996-97. See also C E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114, 1133 (1955),
modified, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), vacated per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
50 54 F.T.C. 814 (1957), aff'd, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826
(1959).
5ld. at 823.
52 Id. at 832, citing Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956).
53 324 U.S. 726, 735 (1945).
54 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945).
55 Dean Milk Co. v. American Processing & Sales Co., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 64301
(N.D. II. 1951). See also Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356
(9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
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would appear to be in accord with the general purposes of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Failure to permit justification in the situa-
tion where an individual seller is faced with a large seller offering
discriminatory prices would force the smaller seller to either violate
the Robinson-Patman Act or be driven out of business.
The courts have required actual, not conjectural, illegality. In
Standard Oil Co. v. Brown,56 the Fifth Circuit held that for pur-
poses of determining "good faith," the competitor's price must have
been adjudicated illegal or be of an "inherently illegal" nature.
"[I]f the seller discriminates in price to meet prices that he knows
to be illegal or that are of such a nature as are inherently illegal,
as was the basing point pricing system in the Staley case... there
is a failure to prove the 'good faith' requirement in § 2(b). ' '
This represents a logical modification which prevents the judicial
addition of meeting "legal" or "lawful" prices from requiring a
businessman to speculate on the legality of his competitor's prices.
Although the Commission might continue to require the seller to
meet its interpretation of "lawful" price, the courts will follow the
admonition of the Report of the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee To Study the Anti-Trust Laws:
The Supreme Court's Standard Oil opinion in several places
adverted to competitors' "lawful" prices that the seller might meet
in good faith, even though Section 2(b) does not expressly so
limit its application. While undiscerning application of the pro-
viso, we agree, could lead to serious abuse, the Court's references to
"lawful" prices must be placed in the context of its Automatic
Canteen and Staley rulings as to a businessman's reasonable knowl-
edge of his rivals' pricing data in a competitive economy.
As the Standard Oil opinion indicates, the legality of a com-
petitor's prices can bear on the good faith of a respondent who
meets them. But we do not interpret the Supreme Court's decision
as establishing such lawfulness as an absolute condition in every
Section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense. Rather, we believe,
the Court's reference to "lawful" prices excluded a price established
pursuant to a conspiracy or an illegal single basing-point system,
or otherwise unrelated to potential differences in the rival seller's
costs.
5 8
It is submitted that this is the proper line of reasoning to follow.
56 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956).
57Id. at 58.
5 8 ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTiTRUST REP. 181-82 (1955). The report sub-
stantiated its view by stating:
A businessman who operates in the haste and pressures of the market cannot
always prophecize [sic) whether the competitor's price which he must meet
may later be held unlawful; nor is overall anti-trust policy furthered by in-
formation exchange programs to spread such knowledge among competitors.
Id. at 182. (Footnotes omitted.)
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In cases where the issue of the legality of a competitor's prices
is raised, the key usually lies in the presumption that the competi-
tive prices are legal unless demonstrated otherwise. Although the
FTC and the private litigant may challenge the legality of the
prices met by the seller, there is difficulty in obtaining evidence of
the unlawful price. This task would be especially onerous for the
private litigant who is not armed with the investigatory powers of
the FTC. Even for the Commission, two or more investigations
would be necessary - a costly proposition.
D. Defensive Pricing
Closely related to the issue of meeting the "legal" lower price
of a competitor is the nature of the seller's pricing practices. One
undisputed characterisic of the section 2(b) proviso is its defensive
quality. The Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC59 spe-
cifically recognized this defensive character by refusing to apply the
section 2(b) justification where the seller's price reductions under-
cut the "lower prices" of a competitor." In most cases undercutting
a competitor's price is not deemed "meeting' an equally low price.
It must be noted that the mere fact that the seller's price is lower
than his competitor's does not mean that the good faith meeting of
competition defense is unavailable. Several judicial decisions indi-
cate that a seller may still avail himself of section 2 (b) if there
is underpricing incidental to the pressure of the market place. 1
The Supreme Court in FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co." stated: "We
agree with the Commission that the statute at least requires the
seller, who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show the exis-
tence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person
to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet
the equally low price of a competitor.""a The Court further recog-
nized that this test did not place an impossible burden on competing
sellers who seek to rely on section 2 (b) to justify price discrimina-
tions. The facts in the Staley case reveal that the seller's salesmen
59 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
60 Id. at 241-42, 249.
61 One such contrary decision is Samuel HL Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d
Cit.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), which construed the words "equally low" of §
2(b) to mean "no lower." Id. at 380. On rehearing the court stated that a seller need
only prove that he did not intentionally undercut his competitors. Samuel H. Moss,
Inc. v. FTC, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam).
62 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
63 Id. at 759-60.
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knew or should have known that the buyer's claims as to the com-
petitor's prices were inflated.6 4
A practical problem has been the development of criteria for
distinguishing between the various forms of defensive pricing prac-
tices. In addition to pricing systems failing to comply with the
"lawful" requirement, several such systems have been deprived of
the protection of section 2(b) as they have been also deemed non-
defensive. One factor in determining the character of pricing prac-
tices is whether activity is directed at the capture of new customers
or is a defensive countermove to retain existing customers. The
FTC in Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc.65 utilized several quotes from
the Supreme Court's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC66 to sup-
port its position that the section 2(b) defense authorized only the
retention of a seller's present customers. 7 In Standard Motor
Prods., Inc.,6 8 one of the reasons advanced for rejecting the seller's
claim of a section 2(b) justification was that the respondent's pricing
system was not limited to retaining existing customers. The Second
Circuit approved this interpretation and stated that under Standard
Oil it was well settled that the meeting of competition proviso could
be relied upon only when it was used "to hold customers rather
than to gain new ones."
Other courts have rejected this viewpoint either directly7" or
by implication. 1 The strongest opinion is found in Sunshine Bis-
cuits, Inc. v. FTC.7 The court stated unequivocally that a distinc-
tion between old and new customers would defeat the purpose of
the act. "If ... sellers could grant good faith competitive price
reductions only to old customers in order to retain them, comped-
tion for new customers would be stifled and monopoly would be
64Id. at 758-59.
65 57 F.T.C. 1036 (1960), modified, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 888 (1962).
66 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
67 57 F.T.C. at 1045-46.
6854 F.T.C. 814 (1957), af'd, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cr.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
826 (1959).
69 Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959).
70Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D. Cal.
1952), af'd, 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
71 Ludwig v. American Greetings Corp., 282 F.2d 917, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1960),
appeal dismissed, 366 U.S. 269 (1961); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block &
Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
72 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 18: 753
MEETING OF COMPETITION DEFENSE
fostered.""3  The court discounted the legislative history of the de-
fense and specifically rejected the Second Circuit's view in Standard
Motor Prods., Inc. as being "not persuasive." 4  The FTC, in an-
nouncing that Supreme Court review of the Seventh Circuit's opin-
ion would not be sought, stated that it would not follow the de-
cision."
In this writer's opinion the FTC position is economically inde-
feasible. The essence of competition is the battle to expand the
market of the seller. To limit the use of the good faith defense to
the retention of existing customers is to penalize the small or ag-
gressive entrepreneur. In its effort to apply the Robinson-Patman
Act to curb the practices of large sellers in individual situations, the
Commission is creating a mold into which the realities of a compe-
titive capitalistic system cannot be shaped. The stringent construc-
tion of the section 2(b) proviso to prohibit defensive pricing in an
effort to obtain new customers would insulate entrenched concerns
from competitive pressures, thus going directly against the funda-
mental goal of other antitrust legislation - a competitive economy.
E. The "Competitor" of Section 2(b)
The -text of the section 2(b) proviso refers to meeting an
"equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished
by a competitor." There was a controversy as to whether the
word "competitor" referred to competitors of the sellers' customers
as well as competitors of the seller. This issue was decisively settled
in FTC v. Sun Oil Co." Sun Oil was an integrated refiner and
distributor which supplied McLaren, a retail service station operator
in Jacksonville, Florida. Super Test Oil Co., a non-brand operation,
opened a station directly across from McLaren and began selling
at prices substantially lower than McLarens."" As a result of this
price differential, McLaren lost a substantial amount of busines,
and he requested assistance from Sun Oil. Sun Oil responded by
selling to him at an increased discount for the specific purpose of
meeting Super Test's prices. This continued for approximately one
and one-half months, during which time a general price war erupted
in the area. The Supreme Court noted that the legislative history
7sId. at 52.
74Ibid.
75 ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION TODAY 75 (2d ed. 1966).
76 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
77 In the Jacksonville area there was a traditional two-cent difference per gallon
between the branded and non-branded gasolines. Super Test lowered its price on week-
ends so that there was a four or five-cent price differential.
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
appeared to favor an application of the section 2(b) defense to a
seller's competitors. 8 But the Court decided to rest its opinion on
the facts which demonstrated that Sun Oil was injuring its other
suppliers.
To allow a supplier to intervene and grant discriminatory price
concessions designed to enable its customer to meet the lower
price of a retail competitor who is unaided by his supplier would
discourage rather than promote competition. So long as the price
cutter does not receive a price "break" from his own supplier, his
lawful reductions in price are presumably a function of his own
superior merit and efficiency. To permit a competitor's supplier
to bring his often superior economic power to bear narrowly and
discriminatorily to deprive the otherwise resourceful retailer of
the very fruit of his efficiency and convert the normal competitive
struggle between retailers into an unequal contest between one re-
tailer and the combination of another retailer and his supplier is
hardly an element of reasonable and fair competition. We see nojustification for such a result in § 2 (b).7 9
The argument that a failure to permit seller assistance to a pur-
chaser would promote price rigidity was rejected on the grounds that
the ability of a large supplier to make "spot" price reductions would
discourage enterprising independent competitors of the buyer.8"
The Court further stated that discounts to McLaren would injure
other Sunoco service station operators who would have their business
diverted to McLaren.8s  The Court did imply that if the Super Test
station operator was aided by his supplier, then Sun Oil would be
meeting its own competitors." In its treatment of the case, the
court of appeals set aside the Commission's cease and desist order
and remanded the matter to the FTC to permit Sun Oil to introduce
such evidence. 3
The economic rationality of the Supreme Court's decision is
open to question. In this writer's opinion the view of the Fifth
Circuit in reversing the Commission is more realistic in the context
of the market place. The court of appeals concluded that an inter-
pretation which would not allow a seller to give discounts so that
his customer could compete with a supplier-retailer
conflicts with the purpose of the Act to protect the small retailer;
78371 U.S. at 519.
791d. at 522.
8 0 1d. at 523.
8 1 1d. at 518.
821d. at 522.
83Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 481 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505
(1962).
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fosters vertical integration of retailing operations, jeopardizing
the future of the non-major as well as the independent filling sta-
tion operator; discourages sound marketing in that it confers a
competitive advantage on a supplier gaining trade by sporadic
predatory low prices unrelated to economic factors, in the sense
that a high-volume low margin policy of a super-market is related
to such economic factors as low cost efficiency of operation and
the maximization of over-all profit; denies the realities of the mar-
ket place in refusing to accept the undeniable fact that a supplier
of gasoline competes with a supplier-retailer at the consumer level
through filling station operators; tends to spread rather than local-
ize price wars; and makes it impossible, as a practical matter, for
a supplier to defend one of its filling stations, fighting for survival,
or even to defend itself against the destructive price raids of a
supplier-retailer 8 4
It is submitted that temporary cooperative pricing by a retailer
and his supplier may be an indispensable defensive maneuver to
exist in a local price war. A supplier may have to supplement
the limited resources of his small retailer, the only other alternatives
being forward integration by the seller or the loss of a buyer.
There is a mutuality of interest between ;the seller and buyer in
meeting the equally low price of the latter's competitor. In spite
of the writings of many 5 and the economic realities discussed above,
the term "competitor," in the context of the section 2(b) proviso,
includes only competitors of the seller.
F. Burden of Proof
As previously stated the meeting of competition defense is
available to a seller only after the FTC or the private litigant has
established a prima fade violation of a provision of the Robinson-
Patman Act." The FTC and the courts have unanimously inter-
preted section 2(b) to require the seller to assume the burden of
bringing himself within the exculpating provision. 7
The crux of the problem concerning the burden of proof is not
the allocation between the litigants but the type and amount of
evidence required to sustain a section 2(b) defense. The FTC has
84 Ibid.
85 Rown, PRIcE DIscRnNATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 250-55
(1962); Note, 62 COLUM. L REV. 171 (1962); Note, 75 HARV. L Rv. 429 (1961);
Note, 47 VA. L. REv. 1229 (1961); Note, The Good Faith Defense of the Robinson-
Patm ea Act. A New Restriction Appraised, 66 YALE IJ. 935 (1957).
86 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
87 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 246 (1951); FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721-26 (1948); FTC
v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 758-59 (1945).
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its own concept of the type of evidence a respondent must introduce
to fulfill his burden of proof for justifying the discriminatory prac-
tices. The appellate courts have not always accepted the Commis-
sion's findings on the sufficiency of the evidence but have usually
followed the factual determinations made by the Commission. Un-
less a seller is prepared to appeal an adverse ruling of the FTC,
he must satisfy the evidence requirements of the Commission. To
discern the relevant facts necessary to establish a good faith meet-
ing of competition defense, the few cases in which the Commission
has sustained the defense should be carefully analyzed.
The first case in which the Commission upheld the respondent's
defense under section 2(b) was Continental Baking Co.88 There
the seller was charged with violating the section 2(a)8" prohibition
on price discrimination and the section 2(d)9" ban on nonpropor-
tional advertising allowances. The Commission, speaking through
Commissioner Elman, found that the respondent had factually estab-
lished the good faith meeting of competition justification. The
following facts were gleaned from the submitted evidence. First,
Continental had for many years refused to grant discriminatory dis-
counts in spite of its major competitors' discounting practices. Dis-
counts were given only after Continental's officers concluded that
the company's market position was being impaired and that dis-
counts were necessary to prevent further loss of business. Second,
a highly selective discount policy had been adopted by the respon-
dent which granted discounts to particular customers only when
that buyer was offered an equal or larger price cut on a competing
product line. Third, the only price reductions responded to by
Continental were those deemed by Continental's officials to induce
regular customers to shift to a competitor. Next, Continental took
steps to verify the customers' claims of price concessions from com-
petitors. Finally, none of the discounts granted ever produced a
price lower than the price offered by a competitor. Commissioner
Macntyre filed a separate opinion in which he analogized the
granting of a price differential to self-defense. In Beatrice Foods
Co.,"' a case with similar facts, the hearing examiner accepted the
respondent's good faith defense.
In Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., 2 the FTC also accepted
8 8 No. 7630, FTC, Dec. 31, 1963.
89 Robinson-Patman Act 5 2 (a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1964).
90 Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (d), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (d) (1964).
9 1 No. 7599, FTC, Sept. 15, 1964.9 2 No. 7864, FTC, Feb. 24, 1964.
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the good faith meeting of competition defense. There a cigarette
wholesaler made discriminatory price cuts to retail chains to match
offers from cigarette manufacturers selling directly to these same
retailers. State law required a state tax stamp to be affixed within
the state to all cigarette packages. The chain retailers had the
alternative of either setting up their own stamping services or pur-
chasing from wholesalers, such as Ponca, who would perform the
service. The majority with Commissioner Maclntyre writing the
opinion accepted the defense on the ground that Ponca had to
make the price discounts to stay in business.
In all of these cases the Commission found an underlying theme
of competitive necessity to justify the discriminatory practices. The
hope of sellers for future effective use of the section 2(b) proviso
was short-lived. In Callaway Mills,98 the Commission sought to
impose further requirements which had to be satisfied. The respon-
dent was required to introduce evidence that not only were ;the
goods of its competitors of comparable quality and salability but
also the schedule of volume allowances was in response to indi-
vidual competitive situations. Commissioner Blman dissented on
both issues - the necessity of proving like grade and quality and
proof of defensive pricing. The dissent did not accept the assump-
tion that the adoption of a discount price schedule was not defensive
and stated that to require Callaway Mills to negotiate with over
2,200 customers on numerous grades of carpeting would place an
impossible burden on the seller.
The split within the Commission on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence necessary to establish a section 2(b) defense has recently be-
come more pronounced. A recent case which illustrates the split
within the Commission on this issue is National Dairy Prods. Corp.94
The Sealtest Division of National Dairy was charged with violation
of sections 2 (a) and 2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act in the sale
of ice cream and milk in four areas by giving substantial rebates
to large purchasers. To justify these rebates under the meeting of
competition defense, the dairy sought to demonstrate an identity of
its costs with competitors', thus drawing an inference that the prices
of its competitors were legal and were lower than its own. 5 In
applying the test that a respondent must show the existence of facts
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the seller's
98No. 7634, FTC, Feb. 10, 1964, rev'd, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
94 3 TRADE Rr. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 5 17656 (FTC July 28, 1966).
95 Id. at 22922.
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
discriminatory prices would in fact meet the equally low prices of
a competitor, Commissioner Dixon, writing for the majority, stated:
[TJhe fact that respondent [the dairyl knew its competitors' dis-
count schedules does not mean that it knew, or that it had any
reasonable basis to assume, that the wholesale list prices of these
competitors were the same as its own. It is obvious that if re-
spondent's milk is normally competitive at a 3 percent discount
with a competitor's milk at a 6 percent discount, respondent by
granting the 10 percent discount to meet the 10 percent discount
on the competitors' schedule, could not claim to be meeting the
competitor's lower price. In such a case, respondent would be sub-
stantially undercutting the price of its competitor by granting the
same discount.96
The majority distinguished the Continental Baking97 decision,
where there were explicit findings that the respondent's prices were
no lower than competitors, from the National Dairy decision, where
the respondent was relying on an inference of the identity of price
lists "when the facts, known to respondent, indicate the contrary.""8
The Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC9 decision of the court of appeals
was distinguished on the grounds that National Dairy was defending
special discounts given in individual situations not justifying an en-
tire discount schedule.' 0 After rejecting the proffered meeting of
competition defense and cost justification evidence, the Commission
upheld the examiner's finding that the Robinson-Patman Act had
been violated.'
The opinion of the Commission was not unanimous, as Com-
missioner Elman issued a strong dissent. The dissent accused the
majority of disregarding FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.' and Calla-
way Mills' which required the seller to prove that its list prices
were the same as or no lower than those of its competitors.0 4 It
was Commissioner Elman's view that the only relevant question is
whether the seller had reason to believe the buyer would shift his
96Id. at 22923.
9 7 No. 7630, FTC, Dec. 31, 1963. For a discussion of the case, see text accompany-
ing note 88 supra.
98 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 22923.
99 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
100 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 22921-22.
101 Id. at 22930.
102 324 U.S. 746 (1945). For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes
31-32, 54 supra.
103 No. 7634, FTC, Feb. 10, 1964. For a discussion of the case, see text accompany-
ing note 93 supra.
104 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 22930-32.
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business unless the seller matched the competitor's discounts; the
Commissioner pointed out that if the seller attempted to satisfy the
majority's test, he would run afoul of other antitrust laws." 5 The
dissent also noted that the majority was resurrecting the idea, with
its unrealistic view of the market place, that a seller seeking the
protection of section 2(b) must affirmatively show that he had rea-
son to believe the competitor's prices were lower than his own and
lawful.' Commissioner Reilly in a concurring opinion sought to
refute the dissent by reference to the A. E. Staley decision wherein
the Supreme Court cited the failure of a seller to verify the lower
price of a competitor as a reason for refusing to allow the section
2(b) defense.'
On the same day as the decision in National Dairy was issued,
the Commission split along the same lines in Tri Valley Parking
Ass'n 08 The FTC had charged an agricultural cooperative, selling
and distributing canned fruit and vegetables, with marketing to
large retail chains at a lower price. In finding unjustified discrimi-
natory practices, the majority utilized the test of competitive neces-
sity.0 9 Commissioner Elman dissented, citing his dissent in Na-
tional Dairy."0
If the Commission adheres to its present interpretation as to
the type and sufficiency of evidence required of a seller to sustain
his burden of proof, then for all practical purposes the good faith
meeting of competition defense is not a viable means of justifying
a discriminatory practice in an FTC proceeding. The type of evi-
dence necessary to prove that the seller knew or had reason to
believe that his competitor's prices were lawful and lower than his
own in each individual competitive situation is usually unavail-
able. Under the doctrine of competitive necessity, the seller is re-
quired not only to make a decision as to the lawfulness of his com-
petitor's price but also to demonstrate a perfect knowledge of the
competitor's prices. It strains the imagination to believe that the
draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act and the members of the
Supreme Court could have contemplated such a strict evidentiary
requirement. The interpretation of the Commission negates the
'
0 5 Id. at 22931-32.
106 Id. at 22932.
o7 Id. at 22933-34.
1083 TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 9 17657 (FTC July 28, 1966).
109 Id. at 22938-40.
110 Id. at 22942, 22946.
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entire concept of good faith that is implicit in the very words of
the statute. The position of Commissioner Elman in Callaway Mills
and National Dairy recognizes that good faith in a theoretical con-
text differs from the good faith of a businessman in the economic
realities of the market.
G. Role of Good Faith
The one element that pervades all cases involving the meeting
of competition defense of section 2(b), yet is incapable of accurate
definition, is good faith. The best characterization of this "good
faith" concept is supplied by Frederick M. Rowe:
As a catchall criterion in judging the factual sufficiency of a ten-
dered section 2 (b) justification, the statutory phrase "good faith"
in section 2(b) has created confusion. Applied in disparate con-
texts without common connotation, an inscrutable "good faith" con-
cept has obfuscated a fuzzy phase of the law. Clarity is fostered
by a recognition that "good faith" does not constitute a "term of
art" or an additional element beyond the meeting of a competitor's
equally low price, but rather mitigates the literal text of section
2 (b).i"l
Although the judicial decisions do not indicate a concrete and pre-
cise definition of good faith, the opinions do reflect the spirit of
the term. The Supreme Court, in the first Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC112 case, used the term "good faith" in its analysis of the le-
gality of the prices quoted by the seller's competitors." 3  In the
second Standard Oil Co. v. FTC"4 case, the Supreme Court charac-
terized price differentials under a reciprocal pricing system as not
consonant with "good faith." ' The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC. 6 equated "good faith" with
the intent of a seller to sell at quoted prices." 7  The only conclusion
that can be drawn from these cases is that "good faith" is dependent
upon the facts of the individual situation. Despite an attempt by
the FTC to limit "good faith" by the application of a per se ap-
proach to Robinson-Patman Act violations, the courts have suc-
cessfully resisted such an interpretation.
"I RowH, op. cit. supra note 85, at 248.
112340 U.S. 231 (1951).
113Id. at 244, 255.
114355 U.S. 396 (1958).
"1Id. at 401.
116 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
11Id. at 380.
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The crucial problem is the future meaning that will be ascribed
to "good faith." The Report of the Attorney General's National
Committee To Study the Anti-Trust Laws made the following state-
ment:
We recommend that the term "good faith" be utilized solely to
test the seller's adherence to the basic objectives of the meeting
competition proviso: facilitating price reductions in genuine re-
sponse to competitive market pressures in order to equalize a com-
petitive opportunity. In practice, this will disqualify the seller to
whom meeting of competition is only an incidental by-product of
a scheme to monopolize or other objective inimical to overall anti-
trust policy118
Several experts have concurred with this view."' Others pre-
fer a more pragmatic approach in which the facts of the individual
competitive situation determine whether "good faith" exists. Com-
missioner Elman explained this concept of "good faith."
This is a flexible and pragmatic, not technical or doctrinaire, con-
cept. The standard of good faith is simply the standard of the
prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably be-
lieves is a situation of economic necessity ... Such a standard,
whether it be considered "subjective" or "objective" is inherently
ad hoc. Rigid rules and inflexible absolutes are especially inappro-
priate in dealing with the 2(b) defense; the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case, not abstract theories or remote con-
jectures, should govern its interpretation and application. Thus,
the same method of meeting competition may be consistent with
an inference of good faith in some circumstances, inconsistent with
such an inference in others.' 20
Another possible use of "good faith" is to mitigate the literal
prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is submitted that the
application of the Robinson-Patman Act may in certain situations
be anti-competitive and seriously impede the marketing of goods.
This writer believes that the role of the good faith provision of
section 2(b) should be to permit a seller to compete effectively in
the market so long as the overall economic consequences are bene-
ficial. The fact that another competitor is injured in the process
of competition should be of little or no consequence in determining
good faith.
It is the good faith aspect of the meeting of competition de-
fense that furnishes a means of coalescing the Robinson-Patman
118 ATrY G N. NA'L ComL ANTITusT REP. 184 (1955).
119BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT, SU mARY AND COMMENT 33-34
(1964); ROWE, op. cit. supra note 85, at 249.
120 AN sT & TRADE REGULATION TODAY 176 (2d ed. 1966).
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Act with the Sherman Act 21 and the other provisions of the Clay-
ton Act.'22 These latter statutes are designed to curb the develop-
ment and use of economic power, whereas the relative economic
strength of a violator of the Robinson-Patman Act is irrelevant if
an "injury" is produced. So long as the FTC utilizes the diversion
of business test to ascertain the competitive injury, there must be
a means of shifting the emphasis from injury to a competitor to a
protection of competition. Only if the good faith concept is con-
strued so as to consider all relevant economic factors, can there be
found economic rationality in the Robinson-Patman Act and the
development of a cohesive national policy regarding economic con-
centration.
1M_. EVALUATION OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
It was stated earlier that an attempt would be made to show
that the correct application and construction of the good faith meet-
ing of competition defense can be the means of coalescing the
Robinson-Patman Act with the other antitrust laws and bringing
economic rationality to the act.' Up to this point in the discussion,
however, attention has primarily been focused upon one section of
the act - section 2(b). Therefore, both the economic theory
underlying the entire act and the implications of that theory must
be examined before a meaningful analysis of coalescence and eco-
nomic rationality can be undertaken.
A. Economic Analysis
As previously mentioned the primary motivating force behind
the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act was an effort to curb
the economic power of large retail chain stores. 24 The mechanism
used was to prohibit a seller from marketing his product at more
than one price, the belief being that the seller would be able to
resist the coercive pressure of a large buyer. The circuitous manner
of attacking this problem is readily apparent, for the thrust of the
act is mainly directed at the pricing practices of the seller rather
than the economic power of larger buyers.
The result of this backhanded draftsmanship has been to pro-
12126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
12238 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
M See text accompanying note 2 supra.
124 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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tect competitors rather than stimulate competition. Supporters of
the Robinson-Patman Act claim that by protecting individual com-
petitors, competition is strengthened by keeping those competitors
in the relevant market. This might be a valid assumption in a
situation where the wrongdoer is an economically powerful unit
seeking to destroy a smaller competitor. On the other hand, if a
small firm using similar discriminatory practices is seeking to in-
vade the market area of a larger competitor, discriminatory practices
might produce desirable economic consequences. It is suggested
that in certain instances legislation designed to protect competitors
may produce a result that is anti-competitive or that is not economi-
cally beneficial. The sheltering of inefficient and laggard firms
from the pressures of competition cannot beget economic results
such as lower prices for consumers and efficiency in the distribution
process. The interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act by the
FTC and by some courts produced such consequences. To integrate
the Robinson-Patman Act into the framework of the nation's policy
of competition which is designed to produce economic efficiency,
the good faith meeting of competition must be broadly construed
so as to permit the consideration of economic results. The follow-
ing are a few of the ways in which the section 2(b) defense can
read economic rationality into the Robinson-Patman Act.
(1) Relative Market Strength.-The relevancy of the relative
market strength of the firm engaging in a discriminatory practice
in ascertaining the effect of the violation on competition should be
recognized. If the firm is a new entrant or a small factor in the
market, then there is no injury to competition even if the sales of
the firm are substantially increased. Prevention of a new entrant
from giving discounts in an effort to obtain customers might raise
the cost of entry to such a point that existing firms have the market
to themselves. Even if entry is not rendered impossible, the prohi-
bition of discounts designed to attract additional customers might
prevent a new entrant from reaching a size where economies of scale
would lower the per unit price. This in the long run would reduce
the possibility of effective competition with larger sellers. By protect-
ing an entrenched seller from price warfare, a higher per unit
profit can be extracted from the consumer.
(2) Price Benefits Accruing to the Consumer.-The possi-
bility of discriminatory practices leading to lower prices to the con-
sumer is probably the most important factor that has been over-
looked in Robinson-Patman Act litigation. One economic fact that
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was overlooked in the FTC Final Report on the Chain Store Investi-
gation1 5 was that supermarkets charged a lower price than their
smaller competitors for the same foods. Today, many of the smaller
units have banded together to form purchasing co-operatives and
thereby obtain the benefits of increased purchasing power. The
result has been that until recently food prices have remained rela-
tively stable while other prices were rising. The real beneficiaries
were the consumers.
Another instance of the public benefiting from lower prices is
the eruption of a price war. The consumer does not care who
wins or loses, or even if the lower price is not lawful. Why should
the consumer concern himself with the reason for price reductions
unless price warfare is but the prelude to higher prices? Fear has
often been expressed that a large firm may utilize its superior re-
sources to eliminate smaller competitors and then raise prices. This
is a possibility, but the immediate cost to the larger firm and the
realization that exorbitant future profits will attract new entrants
and possible renewed price warfare are deterrents to such schemes.
If price differentials result in a lower per unit cost to the con-
sumer, then one of the key goals of competition is satisfied. To
prevent the quoting of different prices for the same item, would
force the consumer to subsidize the smaller units in the distribution
system.
(3) Possible Misallocation of Resources.-One of the goals
of a competitive distributive system is ,to satisfy the needs of the
consumer at the price that reflects the relationship of supply to
demand. In this vast country there are numerous regional markets,
sub-markets, and buyers. Each has its own particular demand curve
that corresponds to its needs, and these needs vary from region to
region, from sub-market to sub-market, and from purchaser to pur-
chaser. To prevent a seller from quoting different prices in the face
of different demand curves of necessity forces a misallocation of
resources, assuming that the price mechanism can accurately state
an equilibrium of supply and demand. On the other hand, the
seller must have some idea of the price that will reflect the supply.
B. Social Implications of the Robinson-Patman Act
Some of the congressional draftsmen conceived that this legisla-
tion would protect the small business unit and permit a distribution
125 FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 51 (1934).
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system devoid of economic power to flourish. An economy in
which the individual units are of a relatively small size and are
constantly competing for the customer's business on relatively equal
terms was undoubtedly envisioned. This might have been a proper
economic model for the nineteenth century, but it is out of touch
with the realities of our modern society. Not only must business-
men compete with one another, but they must also contend with
a bevy of power groups. Organized labor, "big" government, and
international cartels are but a few of the forces which exist in the
contemporary world.
The twentieth century has witnessed the growth of active power
groups, and the nation has expanded to a population of nearly 200
million people. No longer is the population spread out in rural
areas; great centralized urban areas have developed. Considering
the size and demography of the United States, it is a formidable
task to convey food and goods to the individual consumer. Large
amounts of capital and great expertise are necessary to efficiently
distribute the products of the farms and the factories. It is doubtful
that a distribution system composed of small economic units could
accomplish this job with the necessary speed and at the least possible
cost. This is not to suggest that a monopolistic distribution complex
is the most efficient means of transporting goods to the consumer.
However, in light of what has been stated above, bigness should
not be considered to be an evil per se.
One other factor should also be considered. Some have as-
cribed to the small businessman certain virtues that are held in
esteem in a capitalistic society. Like the farmer, the small retailer
is thought to be self-reliant and a good citizen. Although this
writer has never seen any statistical evidence, it is submitted that
the small retail businessman is no more self-reliant or a better citi-
zen than his counterpart who works for one of the large chain
stores. In absence of sociological evidence to the contrary, eco-
nomic consequences should not be ignored in deference to a mythical
belief in the natural superiority of the small independent business-
man. In approaching the problem of evolving a distribution sys-
tem to meet the needs of modern society, the analysis must not be
clouded by any preconceived belief in the sanctity of small economic
units and small retailers. The needs of the consumer and our
economy are so complex and so quantitatively tremendous that the
most efficient distribution system is a necessity.
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IV. GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE
GOOD FAITH MEETING OF COMPETITION DEFENSE
As presently interpreted by the FTC, a seller charged with a
prima fade violation of the Robinson-Patman Act has an extremely
heavy burden in proving that his discriminatory practices are de-
signed to meet competition. In order to obtain the absolution of
his discriminatory price under section 2(b), a seller must affirma-
tively purge himself of any aggressive tendencies and must omni-
sciently discern in each individual competitive situation the legality
of his competitor's price and then must quote a price that "meets"
his competitor's. It is submitted that the FTC by insisting on such
stringent requirements is not only erecting barriers to competition
but is also ignoring the economic benefits that may arise from
discriminatory practices. It is suggested that the role of the Robin-
son-Patman Act in the national policy of control of business be
thoroughly re-examined. In the interim, the good faith meeting
of competition defense can be utilized as a means of accommodat-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act to the realities of the market.
The following recommendations are guidelines for the Com-
mission and the courts in interpreting the section 2(b) defense so
as to encourage competition and obtain the optimum economic re-
sults.
(1) Remove any requirement that the price which the seller
is seeking to meet must be legal. The lawfulness of the price
of the seller's competitor should not be relevant except where there
is collusive reciprocal pricing or a basing point system. In those
situations the legality of the competitor's prices should be a factor
in determining the good faith of the seller.
(2) Aggressive pricing practices must not prevent a seller from
justifying those practices under section 2(b). However, not all
offensive pricing practices should be protected. Prices or practices
that are designed specifically to destroy, not just injure, a competitor
should not be afforded protection under the meeting of competi-
tion defense. This would refer to those cases where there exist
both a predatory intent and the economic power to destroy.
(3) Extend by judicial decisions or by legislation, if neces-
sary, the good faith meeting of competition defense to price dis-
counts made by a seller to enable his customer to meet comped-
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tion. This necessitates a nullification of the Supreme Court's dec-
sion in FTC v. Sun Oil Co.12 6
(4) The FTC must re-evaluate its requirements as to the type
and sufficiency of evidence necessary to prove that section 2(b)
justifies the challenged prices or practices. It is suggested that
the criteria outlined in Continental Bakinglar are too stringent.
Emphasis should be shifted from the defensive nature of the re-
spondent's pricing policies to the economic effect of the discrimina-
tion. This economic analysis should concentrate on the resulting
cost to the consumer and the ultimate efficiency of the distribution
system.
Adherence to these guidelines would involve a shift in perspec-
tive for the Robinson-Patman Act. Instead of repealing the act,
a practical impossibility in the present political climate, the FTC
and the judiciary could initiate the above changes and thus breathe
new life into this antiquated legislation. The consumer both needs
and demands economic rationality in the distribution process which
supplies his goods. Failure of the policymakers to recognize this
fundamental fact can ultimately lead to grave consequences for the
institution of competition and for the consuming public.
126 371 U.S. 505 (1963). For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes
76-85 supra.
1 27 No. 7630, FTC, Dec. 31, 1963. For a discussion of the case, see text accompany-
ing note 88 supra.
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